The problem posed by hazardous chemicals nranuf actured, stored and transported in the Vai Board, 1978) . In Csndda, the total number of incidents involving hazardous products has teen said to 5e in the neiglihxhood of five thousand ainually.2
In t3e U. S., ovcr 1,000 iicw chemicals entsr the commercial market annually (Brovn, 1970 ) and, at any given time, 70,000 trucks carrying hazsrdous matarials ere on the road.3 in addition, extemivz railroad as well as barge, yipslirie and air cargo transportatim ts undertaken in both countries. has 5een estimnted that four billion tons of hazardous metzrials ore transportsd annually in the U. S. ( S<nilarly, there does not appear tg be a simple Linear relationship beFirst of all, the perceptions tx77~;en Lne objective risk to which a community is exposed sfid prtblic awareness of that risk (Quaxantelli 2nd Tierney, 1979) . of the public seem to be influenced by the public relations efforts of the indristrial community, the media, other influential pereons in a community and so on. high for a sufficient period of time and the affectsd population is forced by circ-amstances to subject itself to that threat, a desensitization process seems to rake place. Consequently, an intense level of threet of long duration mrlp r e d m 5 anxiety relating to that threat. This phenomenon has been noted in dis- Also, it apparo that where the objective level ~f threat is extremely Clearly, public support for community preparedness rests on the Due to the serious oature of the chemical problem in general and the perceptual problems arising among agencies responsible for mobilization for such thzeats, the objective assessments of risk arz invaluable for focusing the problem and removing perceptual impediments. Through such assessments, the sites of hazardous material production and storage and the major transportatiorr routes, constituting the highest risks in a comaunity, can be identified.
The Meardng and Implications of Risk and Vulnerability
The term "risk" has several connotations and will be used here to denote the threat of hazards which chemical agents per= pose for a community, independently of community-wide measures or preparations to reduce the probabilj -V of an occurrence or to mitigate the impact of an incident already under- Ta7aY. cafe the status of a community as a totality. ;:eEer to the threat to which a community is exposed taking into account not onpJ the properties of the chemical agents involved but also, the ecological sL-am.lon OC the community and the general state of amergancy preparedness at
The term "vulnerability", on the other hand, will be used here to indiVulnerability, therefore, will given point in time.
In the case of natural disasters, one can easily distinguish between the tkzstecing agents themselves (earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.) and community-! w w l initiatives with respect to hazard mitigation. However, where hazardous .~iqtzrCals incidents are concerned, an inextricable relationship exists betveen Zho role of the chemical substances involved and the preventive measures employed (or lack thereof). technological by definition, being regarded as preventable due to the human errors necessarily involved at some level. of "risk" and "vulnerability" could not be empirically separated since complex bnteeractions occur between the physical agents, technological processes and safety-related efforts during a hazardous materials episode. This distinction has nevertheless aormiunity planners can pursue according to the relative importance of the two sets of factors in a given situation. This is due to the fact that such problems are This would imply that the notions been made as it serves to illustrate the different: strategies
The first observation that can be made on the basis of this conceptual ;;r ..~etlnetion n vith the question of vulnerability as this r d e r s to a community's overall sensitivity given the existing level of threat and its coping ability. In zxtrame cases, however, the risk posed by chemical agents are so severe as to virtually neutralize community planning efforts given the numerous sources 3f hazards 2nd the potential magnitude of incidents in these communities. In s~c b cases, the focus of planners should primarily concern the risk factor <Cxi hazardous products themselves) and the prevention of such a threat, rst"ner: than upon community-related coping measures. This mzy involve, for x:z-.ple, an increased regulation of industry and, possibly, the modification n4 :adustrial processes themselves. Conversely, the level of community prepstedness may be so high that an extreme risk factor would nevertheless l e w e overall vulnerability at a low lcvel. Therefore, if zoning 1at7s exist and industrial facilities are separated from populated areas by industrial parks, if the community-wide emergency response capability is optimal and so on, tbsn the presence of high volumes of high-risk substances will, to a great extent, be nullified.
is that community planners should generally concern themselves Where the risk factor is low and preparedness high, the resultant vulnerability is ?ow The data used to formulate a risk rnodel may be ohtained from a daza base contpll.ed from prtvious incidents (Jones, 1973) or through the computer simulz--tlou of events as they are expected to occur given a theoretical framework and tile spec3i'ic:ations of: the incident simulated (Silvestro acd Mazurowski, 1978). The phenomena to which risk or vulnerability assessments have been applied ralrge fro= a specific site as in the analysis used for determining building :;a+er=y levels in earthqcake-prone areas (Wiggins, 197b) ; to routes used ?or ~? e txansportatia 02 hazardous commodities as in ilhe Simmons et al. (1974) .mal-Ts Ls of che ralatlve risks incurred by various cocmual;..ies alongside a *:ailroad; and: finally, to the pre-disaster assessment of an entire community 5s .In the Zajjs and Kinrineiman (197Sj comprehensive community vulnerability sodel. Also, as Eenner !I???' h t s noted, risk anillyset 5avz been used for land 1;se guidance as evidence in iitigation and for enviromnerkal impact assessmer.ts.
The inrzumera5le forms and functioas of risk or vulners3ility analyses aye, therefore, evider?t. The primary concern of this paper is the implications for dLsaster plennitg posed by the manufacture, storage m d transportat <on of 'nazrrdcuc materials. The subsequent discussion, consequently, inwlves only those techniques developed to assess the vulnerability of popula--ted areas which are sites for hazardous chemicel production, storage anZ/or transportation. levels, must not only be informed of existing risks to communities but also the response-related capability (including resources) already present in those cornunities if equitable levels of vulnerability are to exist in a region.
Policy planners, whether on the state (provincial) or local
One of the few true vulnerability assessment techniques is Zajic and Himelman's community rating system (1978) which attempts a reconciliation of threat-related factors with a community's ability to cope with such threats. Their index arrives at a maximum disaster rating for a cornunity taking into account the extent of manufacture, storage and highwey, rail, marine and pipeline transportation of hazardous chemicals; the hazard classification of the chemicals involved in eacfi case; the population densities suzrocnding each chemlcal complex or transportation route and the hazard let7el of each route. In addition, the authors provide a series of standard criteria to ascertain the degree of community emergency preparedness.
The objective here is not to provide a substantive critique of this J:?ting system but, rather, to raise several points regarding its application. :award this end, the authors have stated the following: "There is a need for vzrious municipalities to be able to assess the hazards that exist in any cowunity with regard to exposure to hazardous materials" (Zajic and Himelman, 1978: 143). St is difficult to dikeurn from this statement whether the authors recommend the application of their rating scheme to entire municipalities or to specific localities within larger metropolitan areas. standing this ambiguity and despite the aforementioned merits of their system, ?he system may be too specific for a large scale regional assessment and not sufficiently comprehensive for the assessment of a more focalized geographic .ires. If a large metropolis is to be assessed, the scheme is too cumbersome with respect to the resources generally available to city officials as it re-1.ic.s heavily on visual countirig and other observational procedures. The apbudgetary constraints. On the other hand, if the scheme is to be applied to comunities of more manageable size for which highly specific determinations of vulnerability are desired, then this model appears to be at too high a level of generality. As an example, in their determination of a hazard rating for mtoroutes, the only factor taken into consideration is the presence or absence r~f a median. Admittedly, this has been recognized zs a crucial factor; however, mixrous other factors should be considered to capture the construct adequately ::JC<.hLberg and 'Iharp, 1968). 
The haphazard application of comprehensive assessment
Whereas the objective of more general assessments is to provide state or provincial authorities a rough idea of regional differences, the goal of more thorough analyses shoxld be to identify highly sensitive neighborhoods with implications for legislation, emergency response and SO on. It is of limited utiLLty for city planners to indicate that city X is highly vulnerable to chemical emergencies. In most cases, the production and transportation of hazzrdous materials are not evenly distributed throughout a city. High risk azeas must be identified as substantial variaticns may exist among city districcs. hility to emergency-related resourccs, the locus of fornulation of disaster iJlans, poli2ical jurisdictions and on the basis of the manner in which environIcental manipulations (the rerouting of hazardous material traffic, the deploypent 05 emergency response personnel, etc.) can be undertaken. In short, cormunities selected for assessnent should be relevant to ecological realities and the manner in which resources are distributed in a region. It is of little use, therefore, to select for assessment a neighborhcjod where: geographically, few environmental oodifications can be made and vhich is serviced by ernergencyrelevant agencies based outside of its boundaries. In such cases, the area to be assessed should be extended to one which is a relatively self-contained unit but vhich, nevertheless, is sufficiently confirm? to render couiprehensiva analyses relevant.
Zones for analysis should be selected on the basis of their accessaAssessments of the more general type should coriiprise basic factors which tfould provide sufficient differentiation between cities with the ratings obtained being of relevance to planners. five-digit figures such as the 11,134 point rating for one Gntario city. The practitioner cannot readily ascertain whether a significant difference exists betricen that figure and-say, ratings of 10,500 or 9,000 or 14,000. lines for tke interpretation of @he rathgs were provfded. In this case, can one assume thzt che differences between ratings are proportional? arcis, if one city obtains a rating of 10,000 and aaother of 9,000 then is the first ten percent more vulnerable than the second? due to the nature of the computations involved in their system and due to the fact that their index Is not a retio scale--w absokite zero value exists.
Zajic and Himmelman have arrived at Eo guide-

In other
This cannot be. claimed The first factor could involve the density of manufacturing and storage facilities in a community. prise a mere absolute counting of facilities within a specified area as has been done in the past. Consideration would-be given to the total land area of the region msessed. As the computation of the total acreage of land used by production and storage facilities would be irksome defeating the purpose of the scheme, one can select the total number of employees engaged in production and other blue collar work in such facilities as a reasonable indication of their size. various federal agencies. size (in square miles) of the area assessed. At this point, the figure obtained could either be placed in a high or low density category providing a rating of one point to a community in the first category and a zero rating for a community in the second. Or, if ordinal measurement was desired, five levels of density, for example, could be established spriosi providing a city in the lowest density category with a zero rating, one in the next with a .25 rating, one in the next with a .50 rating, one in the next with a .75 rating and a city in the highest categqry would obtain a 1.0 rating.
As the term density suggests, this would not com-
Such data is collected routinely by Chambers of Commerce and
The resulting figure could then be divided by the The density factor would probe both the likelihood of an incident origfnating from a community and the probability that such an incident would impact the population therein. as well as the physical harm inflicted upon the community. The density figure SO incorporates (because of its consideration of plant size) the volumes dealt with b ; t chemical facilities and, hence, the potential magnitude of an incident.
Impact, as it is used here, refers to the economic
The second factor that could be employed in the rating scheme is the general proximity of production and storage facilities to residential and commercial areas. This factor is also concerned with the likelihood of an incident's direct physical impact upon a community. Although this fcctor appears to be closely related to the first, the density factor frequently does nor. probe proximity. the overall density figure for the city may be high (if such plants are numerous &nd/or large) although few, if any, may threaten the general community. One could zgain arrive at a high or low proximity determination or ordinally catagmize the proximity of o city 8s extremely low to extremely kigh. maximum rating for this factor would alao be one point.
The
Xext, the transportation factor would have three constituents. Since hazardous chemicals are primarily shipped by road, rail or barge, the determfnatbn of whether a community is traversed by such routes is crucial. 8 simple nominal scheme was used, an affirmative answer in each case t70uld yield a one point rating for each type (of the three mentioned) of major route that crosses ok bypesses a city. @r, through more detailed observation, one could determine the mileage of such routes in a city and then rate the city depending upon the extent of each mode of transportation from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one point.
If
The transportation threat is provid2d greater weight on the ten-point scale (three points) than are the threats produced by manufacturing and storage for two reasons. First, transportation incidents are the most frequent. Second, s h c e vulnerability is of interest here, transportation incidents through their complexity complicate the tasks of emergency preparedness and response. Such incidents may occur at a multiplicity of locations in a city; the identificat 5 -m of spilled chemicals is more difficult; resources for the neutralization of the chemicals are not as readily available; and the incidents are frequently interjurisdictional . introducing problem involving the coordination of response .t While the first three factors dealt with the different sources of hazard in a community (production, storage and transportation), a fourth factor can consern itself with the types of threat to which a community is exposed. This asamtially refers to the types of chemicals produced, stored and transported. F o m s of hazard include fire or conflagration, explosions (vibrations and flyiug fragments), toxic releases (air or water) and damage through sudden. corrosion. provided a o2e point rating. q~ality of the hazard) would have a total weisht of five points which is equivalent to the weight of the first three factors (which dealt with the likelihood and potential magnitude of hazards of differing sources). "risk" scale would then be complete.
Each of these five threats, if present on a major scale, could be Therefore, this fourth factor (dealing with the A ten-point If a vulnerability index is desired, bearing in mind that: vulnerability hare is regarded as a combination (product) of risk and conmmity preparedness, a ten-point scale to determine prepzredness must be devised. Such a scale could rate a community on the basis of the presence of an overall disaster plan, emergency procedures for major manufacturers, a local mutual aid system for resource sharing, physical resources and expertise to counteract the variety of threats existing in the community, community-wide disaster drills and SO 0 1 1 . The resultant rating on this ten-point scale could then be multiplied by the city's score on the initial ten-point risk scale. The denominator and numerator of the resulting figure can each be divided by ten to obtain the city's final rating on a ten-point scale. in Figure 2 First name, middle iniflei, Iset nsme) E. E. Quarantelli Ob. OTHER R E P O R T NO(S) (Any other nuatbra that be a*&ipned thl8 report) d.
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